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Abstract 
In the overall negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP), the digital chapter appears to be growing in importance. 
This is due to several factors, including the recent Datagate scandal that 
undermined trust between the negotiating parties and led to calls to suspend 
the US-EU Safe Harbour agreement as well as the furious debate currently 
ongoing in both legal systems on key issues such as policies to encourage 
broadband infrastructure deployment, network neutrality policies and the 
application of competition policy in cyberspace. This paper explores the 
current divergences between the two legal systems on these key issues and 
discusses possible scenarios for the ultimate agreement to be reached in the 
TTIP: from a basic, minimal agreement (which would essentially include e-
labelling and e-accessibility measures) to more ambitious scenarios on 
network neutrality, competition rules, privacy and interoperability 
measures.  
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Introduction 
As negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) have 
progressed, the digital component appears to be growing in importance. This is due to a 
number of recent events that have led digital issues to increasingly occupy the spotlight in the 
negotiations. First, the Datagate scandal, spurred by the revelations of Edward Snowden, has 
seriously undermined trust between US and EU authorities, leading the European Parliament 
to call for the suspension of the Safe Harbour agreement, which allows smooth flows of data 
between the two sides of the Atlantic. Tensions between the parties at the table are so 
heightened now that it is widely thought that there can be no TTIP agreement without an 
agreement on data protection (possibly outside the TTIP and before its conclusion). Second, 
the growing importance of the data economy and the enabling nature of ICT as a driver of 
productivity and innovation in many other sectors makes the Digital TTIP a key complement, 
if not a precondition, to a successful and comprehensive agreement between the US and the 
EU. Third, the evolution of the debate over network neutrality in both legal systems has led 
the general public to focus on the possibility for the two superpowers to achieve some 
consistency in the regulation of traffic management practices on the Internet. Last but not least, 
all of this is occurring as the stalemate in other chapters (e.g. agriculture, financial services, 
and others) is motivating the parties to revert to the digital transatlantic economy as a natural 
candidate for a resounding agreement.  
To date, however, the evidence on convergence between the two major blocs is mixed at best. 
In fact, while there have been some timid attempts to reach agreement on delicate issues such 
as data protection and cybersecurity, differences in the application of competition law and 
regulation in a number of crucial policy areas (such as online search, e-commerce and 
copyright) seem to be growing, rather than shrinking, undercutting the preconditions for 
creating a vibrant transatlantic digital economy. One easy example is the evolution of the 
European Commission’s antitrust investigation against Google, now coupled with the launch 
of an extensive sectoral inquiry into e-commerce and a pompous campaign against geo-
blocking practices, both likely to target US-based IT giants such as Amazon. More generally, 
the European Parliament and some national authorities (primarily France and Germany) are 
extensively campaigning against the so-called ‘GAFA’ (Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple), 
or even the ‘GAFTAM’ (Google, Amazon, Facebook, Twitter, Apple, Microsoft), all companies 
headquartered in the US. And to some extent, similar signals are also sent by large-scale 
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government policies on advanced manufacturing, which seem to be developing incompatible 
standards in essential fields such as the Internet of Things and cloud computing.  
Many of these initiatives are now included in the new Digital Single Market Strategy adopted 
by the European Commission on 6 May 2015. The strategy, expected to contribute €415 billion 
per year to the EU economy, includes 16 targeted actions based on three pillars: i) better access 
for consumers and businesses to digital goods and services across Europe, ii) creating the right 
conditions and a level playing field for digital networks and innovative services and iii) 
maximising the growth potential of the digital economy. The Commission wants to complete 
the package by 2016, noting that all proposals have to go through the European Parliament 
and the Council: the first initiatives have mostly focused on copyright reform (see below).  
Against this background, what are the prospects for a comprehensive Digital TTIP? In an 
unprecedented effort to increase the transparency of the ongoing negotiations, the European 
Commission has recently stated that its primary objectives in the negotiations on the ICT 
chapter are to improve enforcement of regulations and consumer protection, to make it easier 
for EU firms to export to the US and to cut unnecessary costs. It also stated that the agreement 
will not lead to any lowering of safety and security standards for EU citizens, an outcome that 
some commentators and advocacy groups had otherwise considered likely. Current 
documents released by the European Commission suggest that the parties may be able to reach 
agreement on an initial set of important issues.1 These include:  
 e-labelling: setting standards for providing product information to consumers in electronic 
format, replacing labels and stickers;  
 e-accessibility: making ICT easier to use for people with disabilities and 
 cryptography: setting common principles for certifying ICT products, especially for 
encoding and decoding information. 
However, the Digital TTIP has the potential to become much more ambitious, covering issues 
such as network neutrality and data protection, if not also intermediary liability, cybersecurity 
and copyright. Already in its first document released in early 2015, the European Commission 
mentions one issue that appears simple, but can prove very controversial in practice: the 
potential for an agreement on data interoperability, which would enable users to exchange 
data easily between different products or platforms. In addition, a ‘non-paper’ presented at 
the EU Council Trade Policy Committee by the French and Austrian delegations in October 
2014 contained a much more comprehensive list of issues, including an adaptation of the 
concepts of ‘essential facilities’ and ‘major suppliers’ to the digital environment, an agreement 
on the treatment of digital platforms concerning privacy, interoperability and competition, 
and agreement on network neutrality principles. 
In this paper, we explore the current divergence between the US and the EU on a number of 
issues and comment on potential consequences for the TTIP. Section 1 below discusses rules 
on infrastructure-sharing and network neutrality and the prospects for convergence between 
the two legal systems on these crucial issues. Section 2 contains an illustration of the 
divergence between the US and the EU on antitrust rules. Section 3 compares the approach 
followed by the two jurisdictions in the online search market and in e-commerce, in what has 
                                                   
1 The European Commission published in February 2015 a series of 2-page factsheets and EU textual 
proposals on parts 2 and 3 of the TTIP (see http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1230).  
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been termed the ‘platform regulation’ debate. Section 4 addresses issues related to user 
information and in particular e-labelling and e-accessibility. Section 5 compares US and EU 
public-policy initiatives for the transition towards the Internet of Things. Section 6 compares 
data protection legislation in the US and the EU and comments on possible scenarios for 
transatlantic data flows, including the possible suspension of the Safe Harbour.  
1. Broadband infrastructure and net neutrality 
1.1 Infrastructure-sharing: Between competition and investment 
Over the past decade, the regulatory approach to broadband telecommunications in the US 
and the EU has diverged widely. On the one hand, the US Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) has actively pursued a deregulatory approach in order to stimulate the 
deployment of high-speed broadband networks, which resulted in the lifting of infrastructure-
sharing obligations on high-speed broadband networks since 2003. The presence of a 
pervasive legacy cable infrastructure, which itself could be upgraded to high-speed networks 
thanks to new technologies and standards such as DOCSIS 3.0, has led to the emergence of 
vibrant facilities-based competition throughout the US.2  
On the other hand, the absence (in many countries) of a legacy cable infrastructure in Europe 
has led regulators to opt for infrastructure-sharing, which was made even more extensive and 
invasive after 2003, exactly as the US was going in the opposite direction. The application of 
the so-called ‘ladder of investment’ model to encourage the entry of new players in each of the 
EU member states has led to a significant fragmentation of the market, with hundreds of 
telecoms operators now populating the continent.3 While offering consumers a variety of 
alternative providers, in many countries this fragmentation has led to a catch-22 situation, in 
which the obligation to share any improvements at regulated prices deters incumbent players 
from upgrading their infrastructure and the ability to access the existing infrastructure on 
quite favourable  terms discourages new entrants from investing as well. European regulators 
once placed great hopes in the so-called ‘ladder of investment’ model, under which 
infrastructure-sharing served as a stepping stone to full facilities-based competition. Empirical 
studies have shown that although existing policies have encouraged entrants to shift from 
resale to bitstream access to accessing unbundled local loops, they have failed to encourage 
them to make the final step to full facilities-based competition.4 The result is new entrants 
compete only by squeezing margins ever closer to the wholesale price rather than by investing 
in improved services. Against this background, the only (limited) investment in ultra-fast 
broadband in Europe has come from cable operators and electric companies or from 
municipalities, often using EU cohesion funds.5  
The impact of these policies is most visible in the availability of Next Generation Networks 
(NGNs) capable of providing service of 30 Mbps. Studies commissioned by the US and the EU 
                                                   
2 See Renda (2007, 2009) and Yoo (2014). 
3 For a description, see Renda (2009) and Pelkmans & Renda (2011). 
4 See e.g. Bourreau et al. (2010). 
5 Yoo (2014). 
4  RENDA & YOO 
 
on broadband coverage in 2011, 2012 and 2013 reveal that the US has consistently outpaced 
Europe in NGN coverage (see Figure 1).6  
Figure 1. Next generation coverage in the US and EU, 2011-13 
 
Data source: Yoo (2014). 
Data on investment levels reveal the same pattern. From 2007 to 2012, US providers invested 
on average more than twice as much per household as their European counterparts. Since 2008, 
European investment levels have languished at 35% below their pre-2008 peak, while the 
drop-off in the US has been more modest 7% (see Figure 2).7 
                                                   
6 Note that although the European Commission defines NGN as 30 Mbps service, it collects data on 25 
Mbps service. 
7 Yoo (2014). 
73%
82%
85%
48%
54%
62%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
2011 2012 2013
US
EU
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INTERNET SERVICES: THE DIGITAL SIDE OF THE TTIP | 5 
 
Figure 2. Electronic communications sector investment per household in the US and EU, 2007-12 
 
Data source: Yoo (2014). 
At the same time, a proactive spectrum policy by the FCC has led to the early auctioning of 
the digital dividend spectrum (e.g. the 700 Mhz band), which enabled the early deployment 
of very high-speed mobile broadband networks such as 4G (Long-Term Evolution, LTE). 
Likewise, difficulties in achieving the needed coordination between national authorities have 
led to significant delays in the reallocation of spectrum to mobile operators in key bands such 
as 800Mhz and 700Mhz. The absence of a timely, coordinated EU spectrum policy has made 
Europe a laggard in the deployment of 4G broadband (see Figure 3). The US market has also 
become quite competitive. As of December 2014, AT&T served 99% of the US population with 
LTE, with Verizon serving 96%, Sprint serving 78% and T-Mobile serving 72% (FCC, 2014b). 
This makes it quite likely that more than 70% of the population can choose from among three, 
if not four, LTE providers. 
603 608
546
570 559 562
389
329
253 248 265 244
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
US
EU
6  RENDA & YOO 
 
Figure 3. 4G LTE coverage in the US and EU, 2011-13 
 
Data source: Yoo (2014). 
This stark divergence of regulatory approaches has led to the exact result one would expect: 
while in the US the FCC has started to worry about vertical exclusion, in Europe the priority 
is now stimulating investment and possibly achieving a degree of industry consolidation. Both 
stances bear important consequences for the current debate on network neutrality, since recent 
initiatives in the two jurisdictions on this issue have been grounded in (or heavily affected by) 
the current state of the telecommunications infrastructure. 
1.2 Network neutrality 
One of the policy areas in which the divergence between the US and the EU has been most 
evident over the past decade is network neutrality, defined as a rule prohibiting network 
operators from discriminating between types of Internet traffic and thus obliging them to treat 
all bits in the same manner. Companies operating at the application and content layers of the 
Internet ecosystem have advocated such a rule since the mid-2000s. Their efforts have 
triggered a furious debate first in the United States and later in the EU and globally. 
Arguments in favour of regulatory intervention to mandate network neutrality and to keep 
telecoms networks as ‘dumb pipes’ developed mostly with reference to the infrastructure and 
logical layers of the Internet value chain. On the one hand, telecoms operators claim that 
disabling them from managing traffic on their networks would jeopardise the quality of the 
user experience, deny the possibility of a more efficient and effective provision of the Internet 
service and leave the whole Web prey to spam and illegal peer-to-peer file-sharing, which – 
despite its illegality – has continued for many years to represent roughly half of all Internet 
traffic. On the other hand, ‘neutralists’ challenged this view by stating that the end-to-end 
nature of the Internet should not be contaminated by intelligence in the core of the network, 
which would reduce the value of the network due to filtering of content and speech and the 
narrowing down of spaces for creativity at the edges.  
The network neutrality debate can be approached from several angles. From a competition 
policy perspective, network neutrality is more needed if consumers do not have sufficient 
choice between alternative Internet Service Providers (ISPs): the existence of a single ISP with 
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significant market power could lead to situations in which blocking or throttling of competing 
applications or ‘unwanted’ content could be the equivalent of discrimination or refusal to deal 
(see below, section 2). From a dynamic efficiency perspective, a relaxation of network 
neutrality rules could allow ISPs to monetise investment in new networks by charging 
‘bandwidth hogs’, such as Netflix, a fee for the occupying their networks or by offering certain 
application providers a ‘toll lane’ over the public Internet, where quality of service would be 
guaranteed. Moreover, the neutrality debate has been approached from the standpoint of data 
protection (Should ISPs inspect the traffic that flows over their networks?), innovation (Will 
the new Google be forced to bribe an ISP to be visible on the Internet?), and even freedom of 
expression and media pluralism (Will ISPs decide which content should be prioritised, and 
which one should be delayed? or Should ISPs be free to decide which content to prioritise, in 
the name of freedom of expression?). While a full account of all these positions would fall 
outside the scope of this paper, appreciating the complexity of the debate is critical for anyone 
seeking to assess the likelihood that the US and the EU will find common ground.  
1.2.1 Network neutrality in the United States 
Although the controversy over network neutrality can trace its roots to disputes over open 
access to cable modem systems that took place during the late 1990s, the debate began in 
earnest in 2002, when the FCC issued a ruling to classify cable modem systems as ‘information 
services’ instead of ‘telecommunications services’, which exempted them from Title II 
regulation, including, inter alia, network-sharing obligations (FCC, 2002b).8 The US Supreme 
Court eventually upheld the FCC’s action in Brand X Internet Services v. FCC (2005). 
In response to concerns raised in the aftermath of this ruling, then-FCC Chairman Michael 
Powell (2004) called upon the industry to voluntarily embrace a series of Internet freedoms 
that would ensure end users’ ability to access content, run applications and attach personal 
devices as they saw fit, subject only to restrictions needed to manage networks, ensure quality 
experiences, prevent disruption of the network and prevent theft of service. Powell also called 
for the industry to provide consumers with clear and meaningful information regarding the 
terms of their broadband service plans.  
Concerns about blocking were heightened when a small local telephone company known as 
Madison River Communications prevented its DSL (digital subscriber line) customers from 
using the ports needed to access Internet telephony (also known as Voice over Internet 
protocol or VoIP) The FCC (2005a) invoked Title II when approving a consent decree settling 
this matter. The FCC (2005b) reversed course after the US Supreme Court’s decision in Brand 
X, classifying DSL and other wireline forms of broadband Internet access constituted an 
information service. Shortly thereafter, the FCC also classified broadband over powerline and 
wireless broadband as information services as well (FCC, 2006 and 2007). 
Since then, the FCC has constantly been under pressure to strengthen network neutrality rules. 
For example, at the same time that the FCC classified DSL as an information service, it issued 
                                                   
8 As the cable modem declaratory ruling noted, the federal government had never subjected cable 
systems to common carriage regulation (FCC, 2002b). Just the FCC concluded that broadband was an 
information service did not necessarily mean it would not be regulated. With respect to both DSL and 
cable modem service, the FCC sought comment on what regulations, if any, the FCC should impose 
under its general rulemaking authority (FCC, 2002a, pp. 3040-3048; 2002b, pp. 4839-4854). 
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a Policy Statement recognising the agency’s intent to preserve consumers’ rights to access 
content, run applications and attach devices as they saw fit. As such, the rule prohibited the 
blocking of content, but did not explicitly prohibit non-discrimination and even acknowledged 
the need for exceptions to the no-blocking principle for the needs of law enforcement and for 
“reasonable network management” (FCC, 2005c). But the Policy Statement did not formally 
adopt any regulatory mandates, and network neutrality proponents began to regard non-
blocking obligations as insufficient. Also the US Congress began to debate the issue during its 
consideration of major telecommunications reform legislation in 2006.9 Although attempts to 
introduce network neutrality into the legislation were rejected by wide margins in the House 
of Representatives, the issue proved more controversial in the Senate, where an evenly divided 
Commerce Committee rejected a network neutrality amendment by a vote of 11 to 11. The 
underlying bill was never brought to the floor of the Senate. 
During the Obama Administration, calls for stronger network neutrality have become even 
more frequent.10 After taking office, the Obama Administration included provisions in the 
stimulus package that required that that broadband infrastructure grants made by the 
National Telecommunications and Information Administration comply with the 2005 policy 
statement on network neutrality (American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009). This new 
momentum led the FCC to issue a notice of proposed rule-making recommending the 
adoption of formal network neutrality rules for the first time in 2009: the proposed rule also 
included provisions on non-discrimination, while maintaining exceptions for reasonable 
network management and law enforcement/public safety and applying a lower standard to 
wireless networks. At that time, the FCC decided against reclassifying broadband as a Title II 
telecommunications service. Although the FCC’s first Open Internet Order was adopted at the 
end of 2010, it was not published in the Federal Register until 23 September 2011. Shortly 
thereafter, Verizon challenged the 2010 order in court, with the court resolving the matter in 
January 2014 (Verizon v. FCC 2014). The court ruled that the FCC has ancillary authority over 
the broadband Internet as a general matter, but struck down the FCC’s non-discrimination 
and non-blocking rules as improper exercises of that authority, while providing guidance on 
how to reframe those rules so that they would comply with the statute.11  
In May 2014, four months after the court’s opinion in Verizon v. FCC, the agency proposed new 
rules that followed the approach described by the court (FCC, 2014a). But while the FCC 
seemed to favour a compromise solution in which non-blocking rules would be coupled with 
exceptions for specialised services and reasonable traffic management, the political landscape 
changed abruptly in November 2014, when the President endorsed Title II as the basis for 
                                                   
9 For a review of the history of this legislative debate, see Yoo (2006). 
10 Barack Obama endorsed network neutrality both as a Senator and a candidate during the 2008 
presidential campaign (http://change.gov/agenda/technology_agenda/). 
11 Specific exercises of ancillary authority under Title I are subject to the constraint that they not 
contravene any other specific statutory provision. The statute provides that the FCC can impose 
common carriage obligations only on providers of telecommunications services, not on providers of 
information services. Because the prohibition of unjust and unreasonable non-discrimination is the 
quintessential obligation borne by common carriers, mandating non-discrimination would represent an 
improper imposition of common carriage obligations onto an information service. The court similarly 
concluded that the anti-blocking rule combined with prohibition of charging edge providers any fee for 
providing connectivity essentially imposed common carriage obligations with a price of zero. The court 
did uphold the transparency rules as a valid exercise of the FCC’s ancillary authority under Section 706. 
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network neutrality in a public speech. This speech heavily influenced the content of the new 
Open Internet Order adopted by the FCC on 26 February 2015, and released on 12 March 2015. 
The new Open Internet Order reclassified broadband Internet access services (BIAS) as a 
telecommunications service governed by Title II of the Communications Act of 1934, 
completing what can only be seen as a U-turn from the direction the FCC had taken since 
2002.12 The Order establishes three ‘bright-line rules’ prohibiting blocking, throttling and paid 
prioritisation, with all other conduct being governed by a general standard prohibiting 
unreasonably interfering with disadvantaging consumers’ ability to reach the content, 
applications, services or devices of their choice or edge providers’ ability to access consumers 
using the Internet. The order created exceptions for reasonable network management, defined 
as practices primarily used for and tailored to achieving a legitimate network management 
purpose as opposed to a business purpose. Another new feature of the Order is that it extends 
full network neutrality protection to wireless networks.13 With respect to specialised services, 
which the order renamed non-Broadband Internet Access Services (non-BIAS) data services, 
the FCC continued to permit providers to offer these services while continuing to monitor their 
development and use. But perhaps the biggest change in the scope of the order is the inclusion 
of interconnection in its regulatory purview. Until the adoption of the 2015 order, network 
neutrality sought to equalise how traffic is handled within a broadband network. Regulating 
interconnection, in contrast, seeks to equalise the terms under which how traffic arrives at a 
network. 
What is most striking is the extent to which network neutrality has represented a moving 
target. What began in 2005 as a prohibition on blocking also became in 2010 a prohibition on 
discrimination and in 2015 direct regulation of interconnection as well. At the same time, the 
jurisdictional foundation for network neutrality has shifted from the general, more flexible 
provisions of Title I to the more intrusive framework of Title II. What will happen next is 
anyone’s guess, since (as occurred in 2010 after the adoption of the first Open Internet Order) 
network providers have brought a judicial challenge to reclassification of broadband as a Title 
II service.  
1.2.2 Network neutrality in Europe 
Back in 2005, when the Madison River case was intensifying the network neutrality debate in 
the US, the European Commission was deeply convinced that the debate would never gain 
traction in Europe. Ten years later, it is clear that these early predictions were wrong: since 
2009, Europe has been trapped in a fierce discussion, which – as will be clarified at the end of 
this section – seems to have been recently affected also by the resurgence of protectionism and 
industrial policy at the EU and at the national level and is likely to reach new policy areas, 
such as platform neutrality and search neutrality.  
The first EU rules on network neutrality were adopted in 2009 and included in Articles 20 and 
22 of the then-amended Universal Service Obligations (USO) Directive. Article 20 of the USO 
                                                   
12 The FCC has also stated it will refrain from applying as many as 27 provisions of Title II, and as many 
as 700 codified rules, resulting in what the Commission calls a “light-touch” approach for the use of 
Title II” See FCC (2015, p. 12).  
13 Instead of a separate rule for wireless, the FCC ruled that it would instead simply take engineering 
attributes into account when assessing reasonable network management. 
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Directive mandates that network operators that manage traffic should inform end users in a 
transparent way of the practices they adopt so that users can make an informed choice when 
deciding whether to subscribe. Article 22 of the USO Directive introduced the possibility for 
national regulators to intervene and impose a minimum quality-of-service level in case the 
quality of certain applications became unacceptable for end users, arguably due to traffic 
management practices.  
Despite difficulties faced by national regulators in applying this rule, in late 2013 the 
‘Connected Continent’ proposal presented by the European Commission contained a very 
similar approach. On the one hand, the proposed package recognised that network neutrality 
is what keeps the Internet open and as such should be the default principle for all ISPs (Internet 
service providers) in the EU-28. On the other hand, the proposed rule left the door open to the 
creation of specialised services through agreements between ISPs and application/content 
providers, under the condition that such services do not disrupt the open Internet. However, 
in April 2014, the proposal was significantly modified by the European Parliament, which 
basically rejected the possibility of specialised services and reinstated network neutrality as an 
almost insuperable principle for ISPs.  
The text of the Connected Continent package is currently under trilogue (negotiations between 
the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council), but a political 
agreement was announced by the European Commission on 30 June 2015. Under the new 
agreement, the principle of net neutrality will for the first time be enshrined into EU law: users 
will be free to access the content of their choice, they will not be unfairly blocked or slowed 
down anymore and paid prioritisation will not be allowed. In parallel, Internet access 
providers will still be able to offer specialised services of higher quality, such as Internet TV 
and new innovative applications, so long as these services are not supplied at the expense of 
the quality of the open Internet. These rules will be a reality across all member states as soon 
as the text officially applies on 30 April 2016.14 Accordingly, the final compromise is closer to 
the original position of the European Commission and, as such, contemplates the possibility 
of specialised services and reasonable traffic management. More specifically, the Commission 
explains that “all traffic will be treated equally, subject to strict and clearly identified public-
interest exceptions, such as network security or combating child pornography, and subject to 
efficient day-to-day network management by Internet service providers”.15 
In summary, the EU position on network neutrality is likely to remain controversial in the 
coming years: despite the recent political agreement, which will take effect in April 2016, 
implementation issues are still far from settled.16 Meanwhile, a number of member states have 
taken the initiative to regulate the issue, leading to remarkable inconsistencies across the EU. 
While countries like the Netherlands, Finland and Slovenia have enacted very strict neutrality 
rules, France has explicitly allowed traffic management practices, and the United Kingdom 
regards the possibility to charge quality of service fees as a much-needed opportunity for ISPs 
to monetise their investments in broadband networks.  
                                                   
14 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5265_en.htm.  
15 Ibid.  
16 See Renda (2013) on the lack of detail on the implementation of a rule based on the co-existence of 
best effort Internet and specialised services. 
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1.2.3 Will there be convergence on network neutrality rules in the TTIP? 
Despite the similarities of the terms of the debate on both sides of the Atlantic, there are many 
reasons to doubt that there will be explicit convergence on network neutrality in the Digital 
TTIP, even if – as seems straightforward – such a result would be greatly beneficial for all the 
players in the Internet ecosystem. First, the state of competition and investment in broadband 
networks is very different, and accordingly the rationale for intervening on network neutrality 
(and the likely impact of neutrality rules on the market) is also likely to be very different. Not 
surprisingly, the FCC has mentioned the lack of real alternatives (beyond one fibre, one cable 
and wireless network) for consumers in many parts of the United States as the basis for 
mandating network neutrality in the 2015 Open Internet Order. In Europe, if anything, there 
is a growing concern that there might be too many telecommunications operators, hence the 
calls for industry consolidation and the need to foster investment.  
Second, the recent ruling of the FCC and the upcoming Connected Continent package in the 
EU incorporate slightly different rules on network neutrality. A deeper look at the text of the 
two rules reveals a remarkable degree of uncertainty, both due to the threat of extensive 
litigation in the United States and to the implementation challenges that the rules will pose on 
both sides of the Atlantic. As these uncertainties are unlikely to be solved in the coming 
months, a meaningful agreement on network neutrality seems incompatible with the timing 
of the first version of the TTIP.  
To be sure, finding an agreement on specific issues would be advisable and would add to legal 
certainty and overall market performance both in the United States and in the increasingly 
fragmented European Union. Examples include a black list of practices that are always to be 
considered prohibited (regardless of the market power of the ISP); a grey list of practices that 
are to be prohibited under well-detailed circumstances; and a white list of allowed practices, 
to be consistently interpreted and regularly updated in what could become a very useful living 
agreement. 
Finally, the prospects for an agreement on network neutrality chiefly depend on the position 
that the EU will take in related fields, and most notably in its regulatory reforms on e-
commerce and copyright and in the antitrust investigations against Google. All these dossiers 
are deeply intertwined with network neutrality, not only because they call into question the 
potential introduction of platform-neutrality obligations; but also since they all directly or 
indirectly refer to the conduct of US companies in the European territory. We deal with these 
issues in the sections 2 and 3 below. 
2. Antitrust and cyberspace 
2.1 How similar are antitrust rules in the US and the EU? 
Nowhere have the United States and Europe shown signs of convergence in the past century 
as they have in the area of antitrust. As a matter of fact, the introduction of rules on competition 
in the Treaty of Rome in 1957 is seen as largely inspired by the US tradition, starting with the 
1890 Sherman Act and the 1914 Clayton Act. And indeed, the rules contained in the antitrust 
legislation of the two blocs are quite similar. When it comes to antitrust, however, the devil is 
the details, and the details are numerous. Without pretending to provide an exhaustive 
explanation, this section explores existing differences with a specific focus on digital markets 
and the Internet ecosystem. 
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First, even if the wording of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and Arts 101 and 102 TFEU 
is comparable, the two jurisdictions have taken divergent approaches to single-firm conduct 
(‘abuse of dominance’ in the EU jargon), due to the prevalence of the Chicago School of 
economics in the United States and the influence of the more structuralist ‘Ordoliberal school’ 
in Europe, starting from the early days of the debate on the Treaty of Rome.17 This is not only 
a matter for historians or a subject for academic writings: the different approach has resulted 
in starkly divergent positions being adopted in merger control (e.g. the GE/Honeywell merger 
cleared in the US but was rejected in the EU in 2001) and also most notably in the area of single-
firm conduct (e.g. the US and EU Microsoft cases).18  
Second, some of the most notable differences between the two legal systems on the treatment 
of single-firm conduct are highly relevant for the electronic communications sector. For 
example, EU antitrust rules (and consequently, also the 2003 e-communications package) rely 
heavily on the so-called ‘essential facilities’ doctrine, whereas the US Supreme Court has never 
embraced that doctrine. In practice, this means that EU authorities are more likely to mandate 
asset sharing or compulsory licensing in ‘refusal to deal’ cases than US authorities. Cases like 
Trinko in the United States contrast sharply with the interoperability stance taken by the 
European Commission and the Court of First Instance (now the General Tribunal) in their 
Microsoft decisions in 2004 and 2007, respectively. Moreover, the rulings of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU) on issues of predation and margin squeeze (especially the Telia 
Sonera case) have confirmed that EU antitrust dances to a different drummer than the US. In 
particular, in Europe large companies are explicitly attributed a special responsibility vis-à-vis 
their market, which has recently led the Court to theorise that large firms should ensure, 
besides the survival, also the profitability of their smaller rivals.19 By contrast, the US antitrust 
law has rejected price squeezes (linkLine) and is more equivocal than European law with 
respect to loyalty rebates (compare LePage’s with PeaceHealth). 
Third, differences in the way in which antitrust economics are applied in the two jurisdictions 
becomes even more acute when it comes to high-tech markets and in particular on the Internet, 
due to the prevalence of network externalities and multi-sided platforms. Many of these 
settings tend to be characterised by competition ‘for’ rather than ‘in’ the market, as firms 
compete in a high-risk, high-reward game that produces only one winner. The structuralist 
view of competition prevailing in the European Union reverberates on the authorities’ distrust 
of this dynamic form of competition (regarding it as a ‘sequence of monopolies’, rather than a 
static situation of pluralism), despite the fact that in Europe, just as in the US, market power is 
not equated with market share, but in principle requires a finding of independence of 
behaviour.20 The consequence is that the European Commission can regard certain companies 
as dominant companies even when they have a high chance of being displaced by market 
                                                   
17 See Gerber (1994) and Akman (2009).  
18 Renda (2001 and 2004). 
19 See Petit (2014).  
20 Thus, as the European Commission explains on its website: “Market shares are a useful first indication 
of the importance of each firm on the market in comparison to the others. The Commission's view is 
that the higher the market share, and the longer the period of time over which it is held, the more likely 
it is to be a preliminary indication of dominance. If a company has a market share of less than 40%, it is 
unlikely to be dominant” (see http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/procedures_102_en.html). 
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competitors in the generation of their product in what is an ever-changing competitive 
landscape.  
The continental drift in antitrust, exacerbated by the peculiar economics of high-tech markets, 
lies at the roots of many differences between regulatory practices in the two legal systems, 
particularly regarding infrastructure regulation and network neutrality. It underlies the US 
relatively hands-off approach to both merger regulation and single-firm conduct in 
cyberspace, which contrasts sharply with the EU interventionist approach. And while the 
numerous antitrust investigations against Microsoft in both jurisdictions over the past 15 years 
are probably the clearest illustration of the existing divergence, the current European 
Commission’s case against Google is a good example of a case dismissed by the FTC in the 
United States and currently being re-proposed, with remarkable emphasis, in the European 
Union. The new European Commissioner for Competition Margarethe Vestager announced 
on 15 April 2015 that the Commission had sent a Statement of Objections to Google, arguing 
that the giant IT company abused its dominant position in the “general Internet search” 
market. The Commission has also launched a similar investigation with respect to the market 
for mobile operating systems, apps and services. Most importantly, Ms Vestager is accusing 
Google of having awarded preferential treatment to its own online comparison-shopping 
service to the detriment of competing services. In so doing, Google has allegedly leveraged its 
market power in searching into a neighbouring market, thereby foreclosing competitors from 
that market and thwarting competition on the merits.  
2.2 Is an agreement on antitrust principles in cyberspace possible, and 
desirable? 
In the case of antitrust rules, a full agreement between the two parties in the Digital TTIP (and 
on pending cases) is unlikely for a variety of reasons. First, full alignment of antitrust rules 
would neither be possible, nor advisable, particularly given that enforcement of antitrust rules 
is completely different in the two legal systems. The prevalence of private enforcement (i.e. 
actions before the court aimed at seeking injunctions and damage compensation) in the US 
contrasts with the almost-exclusive reliance on public enforcement in the European Union, 
which significantly limits the effectiveness of antitrust rules. To some extent, antitrust rules in 
the US that appear more light-handed may be more effectively enforced compared with the 
EU’s stricter rules that omit such formidable tools as ‘opt-out’ class actions, criminal sanctions, 
punitive damages and contingent fees between lawyers and clients.21    
Second, the Google investigation is a good example of the attempt to extend the net neutrality 
debate into the higher layers of the Internet. The main allegation against Google is indeed one 
of ‘non-neutrality’: Google is charged with unduly discriminating among Internet content by 
providing a non-neutral, non-objective view of the Internet. Without entering into the merits 
of the Google search investigation, which would exceed the scope of this paper, it is clear that 
advocating neutrality for search engines raises a range of complex issues. And it is also clear 
that in the United States, any attempt to compel a re-design of Google’s home page or the 
disclosure of Google’s algorithm would be seen as contrary to the narrow and deferential 
                                                   
21 See Renda et al. (2006).   
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approach towards product design that US courts have followed since the antitrust cases 
against IBM in the 1970s.22 
Third, any convergence on antitrust rules would have to dispel the suspicion that some of the 
most far-reaching antitrust investigations of the past years have been motivated by a 
combination of competition policy and industrial policy concerns. On the one hand, recent 
rumours have hinted at possible White House involvement in the FTC decision not to proceed 
against Google for anti-competitive conduct.23 On the other hand, the European Commission’s 
current investigation against Google is difficult to disentangle from the calls for enhanced 
regulation of online intermediaries launched by several institutions, including the European 
Parliament and the legislatures of France and Germany. If the Google antitrust investigation 
is part and parcel of a more general tendency towards platform regulation and neutrality, the 
United States is unlikely to follow Europe. This would not only go against the interests of 
many US-based companies; it would also contradict the way in which competition policy has 
been framed and applied in the United States for more than a century.  
3. The EU’s platform regulation debate: Towards the end of the ‘mere 
conduit’ principle? 
As briefly mentioned in the previous section, while the network neutrality debate still looms, 
the Juncker Commission has also launched a new initiative to extend the neutrality principle 
to Internet platforms. Many official documents published by the European Commission and 
the European Parliament in the past months allude to the pressing need to limit US-
headquartered companies’ dominance over the value of the Internet. Since last year, French 
and German institutions have repeatedly called on the European Commission to split Google 
into two companies, a recommendation endorsed by the European Parliament in November 
2014. The French Digital Council has vigorously called for legislation that would impose 
neutrality obligations on large Internet platforms, starting obviously from Google but then 
reaching all of the so-called GAFTAM companies.24 And the first weeks of the Juncker 
Commission seem to have emphasised the need to go beyond a ‘silo’ approach in telecoms 
and media regulation to address the problem of the rising power of over-the-top (OTT) 
platforms through a consistent set of legal documents covering competition, copyright, 
privacy and security issues. What might emerge is an additional layer of regulation and 
responsibilities for Internet intermediaries, which would be a complete U-turn compared to 
the early days of the Internet, when legislation such as the EU e-commerce Directive and the 
US Digital Millennium Copyright Act provided for intermediary immunity to preserve the 
‘mere conduit’ role of network operators as well as the neutrality of the Internet itself. 
The most relevant issues currently being examined by EU policy-makers in this context (and 
most notably included in the Digital Single Market strategy presented by the European 
Commission on 6 May 2015) are the reform of copyright and e-commerce rules, in particular 
regarding the liability of online intermediaries. The two must be analysed together, since such 
                                                   
22 See e.g. Telex Corp. v. IBM (1973); Innovation Data Processing v. IBM (1984). 
23 See “Inside the US Antitrust Probe of Google”, Wall Street Journal, 19 March 2015 
(www.wsj.com/articles/inside-the-u-s-antitrust-probe-of-google-1426793274).  
24 See Conseil National du Numérique (2014). 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INTERNET SERVICES: THE DIGITAL SIDE OF THE TTIP | 15 
 
reform would represent the revision of a concept that has governed the relationship between 
both areas of legislation since the birth of the Internet, namely the ‘mere conduit’ principle. 
Regarding copyright, the Commission plans to propose revisions by the end of 2015. The 
increasingly poor fit between the 2001 Information Society Directive and the features of the 
evolving Internet ecosystem make the need for such reforms particularly urgent.25 In 
particular, the 2001 Directive was adopted at a time when the key principle of Internet 
regulation was immunising ISPs from liability for the conduct of their subscribers. The US 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act follows the same approach. Both enactments are strongly 
linked to the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty, which sought to strengthen technological 
protection measures while preserving the ‘dumb pipe’ nature of ISPs.26 Moreover, the 2001 
Directive clearly reflects the assumption that digital rights management technologies would 
become the dominant mechanism for protecting content online, an assumption that has proven 
wrong in many media sectors. Since then, many member states (with France often being the 
most vocal) have called for giving ISPs greater responsibility for detecting and even penalising 
copyright infringements, which would represent a sea change in EU copyright legislation and 
enforcement.27 This issue has already proven extremely controversial in the negotiations over 
the copyright package: during the hectic debate that led to the European Parliament’s rejection 
of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) in 2012, ISP liability proved to be a 
sticking point for both IT companies and civil society. 
Reforming the Information Society Directive to introduce ISP liability would also clash with 
the ‘mere conduit’ principle introduced in the 2000 e-commerce Directive.28 This means that 
any reform of copyright reform necessarily requires reform of EU e-commerce rules as well. 
In this respect, the European Commission has recently announced a “comprehensive 
assessment of the role of platforms before the end of 2015 that will examine both the sharing 
economy, and online intermediaries. Issues will include such as (i) transparency, e.g., in search 
results (involving paid for links and/or advertisement), (ii) platforms’ usage of the 
information they collect, (iii) relations between platforms and suppliers, (iv) constraints on the 
ability of individuals and businesses to move from one platform to another, (v) the best way 
to tackle illegal content on the Internet.”29 The underlying position of the Commission is that 
while the ‘mere conduit’ principle enshrined in the e-Commerce Directive has underpinned 
the development of the Internet in Europe, today blocking access to and removing illegal 
content by providers of hosting services can be slow and complicated, and “it is not always 
easy to define the limits on what intermediaries can do with the content that they transmit, 
store or host before losing the possibility to benefit from the exemptions from liability set out 
                                                   
25 See Renda et al. (2015).  
26 See WIPO Copyright Treaty and WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, adopted in Geneva, 
20 December 1996 (www.wipo.int/treaties). 
27 See France’s HADOPI law (Haute Autorité pour la Diffusion des œuvres et la Protection des droits 
d'auteur sur Internet), which was introduced in 2009 to promote the distribution and protection of 
creative works on the internet. 
28 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal 
aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market, OJ L 
178, 17 July 2000. 
29 See the European Commission’s Communication on “A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe”, 
COM(2015) 192 final, Brussels, 6.5.2015. 
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in the e-Commerce Directive”.30 In other words, the more ISPs manage and inspect traffic and 
use data generated by user behaviour, the weaker the justification for exempting 
intermediaries from liability becomes.  
Just like the net neutrality debate, the war on copyright and the ‘mere conduit’ principle is 
extending from ISPs into the higher layers of the Internet ecosystem. After large EU countries 
like Germany, France and Spain have taken action to expand Google’s liability for copyright 
infringement, the European Commissioner for the Digital Single Market Günther Oettinger 
recently stated that in future EU legislation, “when Google takes intellectual works from 
within the EU and works with them, then the EU can protect those works and demand a levy 
from Google.” However, recent history about the likely impact of current plans to strengthen 
copyright liability are not encouraging: the two existing examples of ancillary copyright being 
rolled out nationally, in Germany and in Spain, seem to have largely backfired.31 
Finally, one critical component of the current debate on copyright and e-commerce reform is 
the aggressive stance adopted by the European Commission against so-called ‘geo-blocking’ 
practices, now being considered as one of the worst obstacles on the way to market integration, 
and accordingly included in the new EU Digital Single Market strategy.32 Geo-blocking refer 
to commercial practices that either prevent online customers from accessing and purchasing 
products and services from a website based in other member states or automatically re-route 
requests to a domestically located store. As a result of these practices, consumers are often 
charged more for products or services (particularly music or audio-visual) purchased online 
on the basis of their IP address, their postal address, or the credit card used to make the 
purchase. Again, practices adopted by US-based e-commerce giants like Amazon are often 
quoted as the real target of initiatives of this kind. This suspicion was strengthened by the 
launch, on 6 May 2015, of a Competition Sector Inquiry to assess whether geo-blocking 
restrictions (often embodied in contractual and distribution agreements for online trade of 
tangible goods but also in the licensing of audio-visual and content online services) constitute 
undue barriers to cross-border online shopping;33 and finally confirmed by the subsequent 
opening, on 11 June 2015, of an antitrust investigation against Amazon for certain business 
practices adopted in the distribution of electronic books.34   
In conclusion, the EU seems to have opened a debate on issues that are largely underexplored 
in the United States. This is partly justified by the greater integration of the US internal market 
(at least in terms of geo-blocking practices). But at the same time, it also reflects the fact that 
Europe is increasingly considering policies to re-distribute revenues along the Internet value 
chain, away from large IT intermediaries and towards content producers (in copyright 
                                                   
30 Ibid.  
31 In Germany, local publishers were forced to grant Google free use of their text snippets and 
thumbnails after the company delisted them from Google News, and traffic to their websites predictably 
plummeted. In Spain, the severity of the local ancillary copyright law has created an even-worse 
situation – the publishers, who lobbied for the law, cannot grant Google free access even if they want to 
do so, and now Google has axed Google News in Spain altogether, again causing a precipitous drop in 
traffic to publishers’ websites. 
32 European Commission’s Communication, “A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe”, COM(2015) 
192 final, Brussels, 6.5.2015. 
33 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4921_en.htm.  
34 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5166_en.htm.  
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legislation) and infrastructure operators (deviations from net neutrality). We consider it quite 
unlikely that any measure on intermediary liability and deviations from the mere conduit 
principle, if actively pursued by the European Commission within a Digital TTIP, would be 
subject of an agreement. Moreover, an agreement on platform liability based on the emerging 
EU approach would likely be unfortunate in economic and legal terms. Imposing heavy 
obligations on emerging Internet intermediaries both in terms of neutrality and liability for 
copyright and privacy would amount to a true oxymoron: treating them as dumb pipes on the 
one hand and as editors of content on the other.  
4. End user information and accessibility issues  
Among the many issues that are under discussion in the final TTIP agreement, one of the most 
promising relates to consumer protection issues, particularly e-labelling and e-accessibility. 
The first issue relates to the possibility of displaying some of the required and voluntary 
product information via a product’s screen instead of physically affixing a permanent label to 
the product. Electronic marking would ensure that any changes to any labelling mandated by 
regulation can be updated more easily and therefore be more likely to remain current. In 
addition, the use of electronic marking would enhance consumers’ ability to access and 
understand the regulatory information as well as facilitate access by disabled users. It would 
reduce costs and reduce time to market. 
On the specific issue of e-labelling, legislation has already been enacted in both legal systems. 
However, the EU legislation was adopted specifically for medical devices and limited to the 
provision of instructions for use. In particular, Regulation 207/2012 on electronic instructions 
for use of medical devices specifies how to build the instructions for use in a medical device’s 
label in an electronic format and the devices for which they may be used.  
In the United States, the Enhance Labelling, Accessing, and Branding of Electronic Licenses 
Act of 2014 (E-LABEL Act) was signed by President Obama at the end of November 2014. The 
Act requires the FCC to allow manufacturers of radio-frequency devices to use electronic 
labelling for the equipment instead of affixing physical labels to the equipment. The statute 
defines “radio-frequency device with display” as any equipment or device that 1) requires the 
FCC’s authorisation before the equipment or device may be marketed or sold within the 
United States and 2) is capable of digitally displaying required labelling and regulatory 
information. On 10 July 2014, the FCC also issued guidance describing how devices with 
integrated displays can present label information electronically. 
Despite the differences in the frameworks adopted by the two legal systems, there should be 
no significant obstacle to the adoption of common solutions on e-labelling in the Digital TTIP. 
The starting point could be the US guidance on how to present information, with further 
discussions focusing on issues such as the clarity and user-friendliness of the message to be 
displayed, as well as the modalities of the transmission.  
In contrast, e-accessibility has been one of the core issues discussed by the Transatlantic 
Economic Council throughout the past decade. Back in December 2005, the European 
Commission issued standards mandate n. 376 (M376) to harmonise and facilitate the public 
procurement of accessible ICT products and services and to enable public procurers to make 
use of these harmonised requirements in the procurement process. The intention of M376 was 
already aimed at achieving a degree of similarity with Section 508 of the US Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973 (S508), but the industry has long criticised the two standards as needlessly different, 
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and has been calling for further harmonisation for a long time.35 Since then, the M376 and S508 
teams have been working without frequent technical exchanges and on different schedules at 
a time when close cooperation is vital for success. Currently, work is underway to ensure 
better coordination, and the S508 standard is being revised following a proposal by the US 
Access Board, which aims to merge them with its guidelines for telecommunications 
equipment and customer premises equipment covered by section 255 of the Communications 
Act of 1934. The proposed revisions and updates to the section 508-based standards and 
section 255-based guidelines are intended to ensure that ICT covered by the respective statutes 
is accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities. Both parties in the TTIP can use as 
a reference the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.0, an international standard 
prepared by a working group composed of academics and corporate representatives within 
the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C).  
Agreements on both e-labelling and e-accessibility appear to be attainable for the Digital TTIP 
chapter. The European Commission’s TTIP factsheet on the information society concurs, and 
there is no reason to expect negotiations to fail on these issues.  
In addition to these matters, which have been part of the transatlantic dialogue for quite some 
time, other related topics might also find their way into an initial agreement. These include 
consumer protection standards or rules for e-health and in particular M-health applications, 
on which the industry has been quite vocal over the past months.  
5. The Internet of Things and smart manufacturing 
One of the most important current developments in the digital sector is the advent of the 
Internet of Things (IoT). According to major IT companies such as Cisco and Huawei, the 
number of devices connected to the network globally is projected to grow from fewer than 10 
billion to more than 50 billion devices by 2020. The quest for connecting the “remaining 99% 
of things” that have not been connected to date and for capturing market share in the run-up 
to the IoT age is one of the most vibrant competitive races of our time. Like all network-based 
phenomena, IoT is a natural candidate for global standards in order to allow market 
participants to fully realise the benefits of scale economies and network economic effects. As 
a result, one would expect the many industrial sectors involved to share an interest in 
developing standards and rules that will be adopted worldwide. Indeed, a number of industry 
players have called for including harmonised rules for IOT within the TTIP, especially on the 
manufacturing side. However, the temptation to develop incompatible standards as a way to 
protect domestic industry is reportedly emerging, in particular on the EU side.   
In the US, since February 2010, manufacturing has added more than 700,000 jobs, the fastest 
pace of job growth since the 1990s. In order to continue this extraordinary momentum, the 
Obama Administration launched an Advanced Manufacturing Partnership (AMP) within the 
President’s Council of Advisors in Science and Technology. President Obama then launched 
four manufacturing innovation institutes with four more on the way; invested nearly $1 billion 
                                                   
35 The problems are exemplified by the delay in the publication of the latest US Advanced Notice of 
Proposed Rule-making (ANPRM) version of S508 that was announced by the US Access Board in early 
October 2011. Because of the lack of exchange of information, this delay has caused a problem for the 
EU M376 team that could lead to a harmonisation failure. 
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to upgrade our community colleges to train workers for advanced manufacturing jobs; 
expanded investments in applied research for emerging, cross-cutting manufacturing 
technologies; and launched a new initiative to deploy the talent of returning veterans to in-
demand jobs, including advanced manufacturing. The AMP delivered its final report in 
November 2014, making recommendations addressing three key pillars that support 
American manufacturing: 1) enabling innovation, 2) securing the talent pipeline and 3) 
improving the business climate. These recommendations are now being followed up by 
executive actions in all three areas.  
In Europe, work on advanced manufacturing has been underway, especially since the launch 
of the 7th Framework Programme for Research (followed in 2014 by the Horizon 2020 
program) and the Europe 2020 strategy announced in 2010, which contained a flagship 
initiative dedicated to an Industrial Policy for the Globalisation Era. However, the March 2014 
report of the European Commission’s Task Force on Advanced Manufacturing for Clean 
Production acknowledged that initiatives so far have remained mostly patchy and isolated.36 
But the new European Commission seems willing to shift gears and is reportedly ready to 
adopt a non-legislative initiative that will expand the Industrie 4.0 already launched by the 
German government in cooperation with industry and academia in 2011 to the pan-European 
level. The use of cyber-physical objects and equipment in the factories of the future is often 
described as the ‘fourth industrial revolution’, which might prove so disruptive that it is 
expected to bring about paradigm shifts in modes of production and distribution. 
Industry 4.0 is indeed powered by a mix of technologies, which include nano-technologies and 
IoT technologies that design and realise smart objects, cloud computing technologies for the 
low-cost storage of data and applications, a mix of wireless technologies for always-on 
connectivity (including 5G), advanced robotics, 3D printing, and big-data analytics for 
optimised management of the supply chain. A report by PwC for the German government 
estimated that over the next five years, a yearly investment of as much as €40 billion might 
bring an 18% increase in the productivity of German industry and a 12% increase in the 
industry’s turnover37.  
However, the Europeanisation of the German Industrie 4.0 strategy will not come without 
consequences. First, it is to be anticipated that all other member states will find the initiative 
less attractive, since they do not feature the same industry leadership that Germany still enjoys 
in some sectors. Germany’s market for embedded systems, i.e. computer systems with a 
dedicated function within a larger mechanical or electrical system, generates €20 billion 
annually (expected to reach €40 billion by 2020) and ranks third in the world behind the US 
and Japan. Other countries do not reach anywhere near these figures and thus have much 
lower chances to develop industrial leadership in most of the technologies involved. At the 
same time, countries like Italy (second only to Germany in terms of industry size in Europe) 
feature a completely different industry structure, with a myriad of micro-enterprises that 
would lack the scale to fully capitalise on a pan-European initiative of this size.  
But perhaps the most worrying aspect of the European side of the debate is the possibility that 
some of the key industry players involved in Industrie 4.0 might decide to develop standards 
                                                   
36 See http://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/innovation/advanced-manufacturing/index_en.htm  
37 See PwC, Opportunities and challenges for the Industrial Internet, 2014, available at 
http://www.pwc.nl/en/publicaties/industrie-4-0.jhtml.  
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that are incompatible with those being developed in the US, in particular when it comes to 
cloud computing, but also with respect to supply chain management. One possible example is 
the recent joint initiative launched by Deutsche Telekom and SAP to merge production 
technology with IT and telecommunications. The CEO of Deutsche Telekom recently 
observed: “We don't need to fear standards from the United States. We want Germany's voice 
to be heard as well on such an important issue.”38 The emergence of national standards in such 
a globalised industry is apparently motivated by industrial policy, such as the need to counter 
the current leadership of US-based companies, such as AT&T, Cisco, IBM, Intel and General 
Electric, which dominate the top standards alliances in this field, including the Industrial 
Internet Consortium, the Open Interconnected Consortium and the AllSeenAlliance. But an 
additional motivating factor is the desire to respond to the Snowden revelations by creating a 
national environment in which data will be preserved within German territory – the so-called 
‘German cloud’ (or, at least, a European cloud), already invoked a few times by Chancellor 
Angela Merkel.39  
In summary, an agreement on IoT standards would be highly desirable in the Digital TTIP and 
would likely speed up the deployment of Industrie 4.0 technologies. However, such an 
agreement is unlikely to occur, since both parties are deploying advanced manufacturing 
strategies as part of their industrial policy initiatives and are therefore acting more as 
competitors than as allies. In addition, the NSA scandal seems to be making an agreement in 
this field harder to reach and appears to be spurring the development of incompatible 
standards.  
6. A continental drift in data protection? 
No other issue related to the online world has been as prominent in the debate over the TTIP 
as data protection. Even before the Snowden revelations, the issue was almost intractable in 
transatlantic regulatory cooperation. Against this background, the emergence of the Internet, 
and even more of cloud computing, creates significant legal challenges alongside undoubted 
potential benefits. Cloud computing permits a degree of flexibility that makes it increasingly 
difficult to identify who should be held accountable vis-à-vis cloud customers for the handling 
and processing of personal data and on the legal regime that should govern data transfers 
outside the US and EU jurisdictions (Hon et al., 2011a, 2011b, 2012; Schwartz, 2013; Schwartz 
& Solove, 2013). This section briefly describes the existing legislation on privacy in the US and 
the EU and the current debate on the regulation of transatlantic data flows. Section 6.1 
introduces the main privacy laws (along with case law and enforcement practice) in the United 
States and the EU. Section 6.2 discusses the Safe Harbour regime and the Binding Corporate 
Rules. Section 6.3 briefly concludes by illustrating possible ‘landing zones’ in current TTIP 
negotiations or in separate deals.  
6.1 Privacy law in the United States and in the EU 
The United States and the European Union have always followed different legal approaches 
to privacy and data protection (Schwartz & Solove, 2013). First, the US has traditionally relied 
                                                   
38 https://www.telekom.com/media/company/271966.  
39 See, inter alia, Hilmar Schmundt and Gerald Traufetter, “Digital Independence: NSA Scandal Boosts 
German Tech Industry”, Der Spiegel, 4 February 2014.  
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on piecemeal, sectoral regulation and private ordering to address privacy issues. The 
European Union, in contrast, enacted the first horizontal, omnibus data protection laws in the 
1970s followed by the adoption of the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard 
to Automatic Processing of Personal Data in 1981 and the enactment of the EU Data Protection 
Directive 95/46 in 1995. Moreover, in Europe privacy is explicitly considered as a fundamental 
right, whereas the US Constitution contains no explicit reference to privacy.40 Many prominent 
US scholars consider privacy as amounting to a property right, i.e., an alienable commodity 
that can be traded in exchange for customised service. Finally, in the US privacy legislation 
and case law traditionally focused on the protection of the citizen against violations and 
misbehaviour of public authorities (also due to the scope of the Fourth Amendment), whereas 
in the EU the focus is rather on the private sector. In a widely cited article published in the Yale 
Law Journal, James Whitman (2004) interpreted the fundamental divergence between the legal 
approaches to privacy in the US and the EU as rooted in a cultural difference between those 
who view privacy as an aspect of liberty and those who regard privacy as an aspect of 
dignity.41 
6.1.1 Privacy laws in the United States 
In the United States, the right to privacy is historically and legally rooted in the Fourth 
Amendment, which provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” The 
Supreme Court initially framed such a right with respect to the confidentiality of personal 
postal correspondence such as letters and sealed packages.42 Over the past few decades, 
various scholarly approaches to privacy have emerged, mostly viewing privacy as control over 
data and framing it as a commodity rather than a fundamental right, with important 
consequences in terms of its alienability (Solove, 2006).  
Regarding statutory law, early attempts to regulate privacy include the Fair Credit Reporting 
Act (FCRA) of 1970 and the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) of 1974. Other 
federal statutes addressing specific privacy issues include the Children’s Online Privacy 
Protection Act (COPPA), the Health Information Portability and Accessibility Act (HIPAA), 
                                                   
40The term ‘privacy’ does not appear explicitly in the US Constitution or the Bill of Rights. However, the 
US Supreme Court has ruled in favour of various privacy interests, deriving the right to privacy from 
the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.  
41 See Whitman (2004, p.161) quoting Post (2001), and arguing: “Continental privacy protections are, at 
their core, a form of protection of a right to respect and personal dignity …By contrast, America, in this 
as in so many things, is much more oriented toward values of liberty, and especially liberty against the 
state.” 
42 See Ex parte Jackson (1878) in which the US Supreme Court ruled: “The constitutional guaranty of the 
right of the people to be secure in their papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to 
their papers, thus closed against inspection, wherever they may be … No law of Congress can place in 
the hands of officials connected with the postal service any authority to invade the secrecy of letters and 
such sealed packages in the mail; and all regulations adopted as to mail matter of this kind must be in 
subordination to the great principle embodied in the fourth amendment of the Constitution.” Later, the 
US Supreme Court has ruled in favour of various privacy interests – deriving the right to privacy from 
the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. 
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the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
(GLBA). Several of these federal statutes focused on the presence of ‘personally identifiable 
information’ while others focus on transparency and access to information, on protecting 
consumers from inappropriate use of their personal data or on imposing duties of 
confidentiality. Of these statutes, the most relevant are certainly ECPA (in particular its Title 
II, also known as the Stored Communications Act), the US PATRIOT Act and the FAA. All 
these statutes have received criticism over the past few years: while ECPA (and its Title II in 
particular) has been criticised for having been largely outpaced by technological innovation, 
and in particular by cloud computing, the Uniting and Strengthening America Provide 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (US PATRIOT) Act of 2001 was 
criticised for provisions that can lead companies to turn over data to the US government even 
without notice to the customer. Data stored outside US borders, if held in servers owned by a 
US company, are potentially covered by this provision: even contract provisions specifying 
that data will be governed by foreign law can be ignored by the US government.43 But the most 
heavily criticised provision is certainly the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Amendment Act 
(FAA), which amended the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Section 1881a of the 
FAA introduces the possibility for the US government to monitor foreign communications and 
access data of foreign citizens located outside of the US without a warrant (a requirement that, 
by virtue of the Fourth amendment, would apply only to US citizens). A recent report for the 
European Parliament observed that “while there has been a great deal of concern at the 
international level over the US PATRIOT Act, there has been virtually no discussion of the 
implications of … § 1881a of FAA,” which “for the first time created a power of mass-
surveillance specifically targeted at the data of non-US persons located outside the US, which 
applies to cloud computing” (Bigo et al., 2013). 
Beyond privacy legislation and case law, which mostly focuses on the possibility for 
government institutions to inspect personal data and communications, an increasingly 
important player in the privacy domain is the Federal Trade Commission in its role of 
consumer protection enforcer. The number of investigations and sanctions accumulated by the 
FTC over the past few years is remarkable (Cline, 2014). To be sure, the FTC has filled an 
important gap in US privacy law by protecting customers against privacy- and security-
reducing practices adopted by their providers. However, there seems to be significant space 
for a clarification of the FTC powers, as well as of the criteria and definitions used by the FTC 
in enforcing legislation to protect consumer privacy and data security. 
All entities that store consumer information on the Internet face the threat of FTC enforcement 
if the way they store and secure information does not match their declarations to their 
customers. This unfair behaviour amounts to a deceptive or unfair practice under Section 5 of 
the FTC Act. In addition, the FTC enforces a handful of sector-specific privacy laws, including 
COPPA, GLBA, FCRA, TCPA and the Telecommunications Act, as well as the EU-US Safe 
Harbour (see below).44  
                                                   
43 Specifically, section 215 of the Patriot Act allows the FBI to access data related to investigations in an 
ex-parte proceeding with the requirement that “no person shall disclose to any other person … that the 
[FBI] has sought beyond privacy legislation and case law … or obtained things under this section.”  
44 Under Section 5, a trade practice is: 
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6.1.2 The EU legal framework for data protection 
The first European data protection laws were enacted in the 1970s, followed by the adoption 
of the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data in 1981. At the EU level, the right to privacy has been so far regulated by Data 
Protection Directive 95/46 (1995) (DPD), which, however, does not cover judicial and police 
cooperation.45 Other relevant legislation in force include the 2002 and 2009 e-Privacy 
Directives and the data retention Directive, which has however been declared invalid by the 
Court of Justice in a recent decision. The EU data protection Directive applies to data held both 
by the public sector and the private sector. There are, however, important exemptions that 
give government the possibility to access and process data for tax and criminal law purposes. 
As a result, it is fair to state that, contrary to what occurs under US statutory law, the main EU 
Directive applies far more stringently to the private sector than to the public sector.  
In terms of scope, the DPD focuses on the protection of personal data, which it defines as 
“information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person”. No data protection rules 
will apply at all where data are not personal but are instead anonymous, i.e. “data rendered 
anonymous in such a way that the data subject is no longer identifiable” (Recital 26). The DPD 
identifies three main classes of persons to whom EU data protection law applies:  
 Data controllers, who are those persons who determine the purposes for which and the 
means whereby personal data are collected and processed; 
 Data processors, who act under the instruction of controllers and do not themselves decide 
the processing purposes and 
 Data subjects, the individuals whose personal data is being processed.  
The DPD directed member states to impose legal obligations on controllers to protect personal 
data by complying with certain principles when processing personal data, including 
transparency, purpose specification and limitation and erasure, meaning that personal data 
that are not necessary anymore must be erased or truly anonymised.  
Besides the DPD, privacy laws in the EU also include the e-Privacy Directive (as amended in 
2009), which forms part of the regulatory framework for electronic communications and 
introduces obligations of security and confidentiality for providers of e-communications only. 
It deals with a number of important issues, such as confidentiality of information, treatment 
of traffic data, spam and cookies. Security of services includes the duty to inform the 
subscribers whenever there is a particular risk, such as a virus or other malware attack. 
Confidentiality obligations are addressed at member states, who should prohibit listening, 
tapping, storage, or other kinds of interception or surveillance of communication and related 
                                                   
 Deceptive, if it involves a “material representation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead a 
consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer’s detriment”;  
 Unfair, if it “causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably 
avoidable by consumers themselves and is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers 
or competition” (the so called ‘three-part test’ of Section 5(n) of the FTC Act). 
45 Such area is currently covered by the Council of the European Union’s 2008 Framework Decision on 
the protection of personal data processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters. 
24  RENDA & YOO 
 
traffic, unless the users have given their consent or conditions of Article 15(1) have been 
fulfilled. 
Finally, the data retention Directive (2006/24/EC) was adopted to amend the e-Privacy 
Directive to provide a more effective response to the terrorist attacks in New York 2001 and 
Madrid in 2004. It focused on the regulation of data retention to permit access by law 
enforcement authorities for a certain period if necessary as a means for prevention, 
investigation and prosecution of serious crime as defined by each of the member states in its 
national law. In April 2014, a judgment of the CJEU held that the directive was invalid as it 
“interferes in a particularly serious manner with the fundamental rights to respect for private 
life and to the protection of personal data”. Hence, “by adopting the Data Retention Directive, 
the EU legislature has exceeded the limits imposed by compliance with the principle of 
proportionality”. This judgment might constitute an important precedent for the 
interpretation of the validity of existing US legislation (e.g. the FAA) in the EU context and 
shows that even security issues are unlikely to trump privacy when it comes to EU legislation 
and CJEU case law.  
Recently, in evaluating the data protection Directive and related legislation, the European 
Commission acknowledged that the legal framework needs an update, both in light of the new 
challenges posed by technological developments and differences in the ways that member 
states have transposed and enforced the DPD. Moreover, the application of the EU data 
protection acquis in the area of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, 
in particular the 2008 Framework Decision, resulted in gaps and inconsistencies (European 
Commission, 2012). Accordingly, the Commission proposed a strong and consistent legislative 
reform, which consists of a Regulation (replacing Directive 95/46/EC) setting out a general 
EU framework for data protection46 and a Directive replacing the 2008 Framework Decision 
setting out rules on the protection of personal data processed for the purposes of prevention, 
detection, investigation or prosecution of criminal offences and related judicial activities.  
The new proposed rules aim to improve individuals’ ability to control their data by ensuring 
that when their consent is required, it is given explicitly, meaning that it is based either on a 
statement or on a clear affirmative action by the person concerned, and is freely given; 
equipping internet users with an effective ‘right to be forgotten’ in the online environment47; 
guaranteeing easy access to one’s own data and a right to data portability; and reinforcing the 
right to information so that individuals fully understand how their personal data are handled, 
particularly when the processing activities concern children. The rules also seek to improve 
the means for individuals to exercise their rights by strengthening national data protection 
authorities’ independence and powers and enhancing administrative and judicial remedies 
when data protection rights are violated. In particular, qualified associations will be able to 
bring actions to court on behalf of the individual. Finally, the new rules aim at reinforcing data 
security by encouraging the use of privacy-enhancing technologies, privacy-friendly default 
settings and privacy certification schemes and introducing a general obligation for data 
                                                   
46 It should be noted that the choice of a Regulation replacing the DPD implies much less discretion in 
the implementation of the text at national level, as the Regulation is directly applicable and requires no 
transposition measure by EU member states. 
47 The right to be forgotten is described as the right to have one’s data deleted if the owner withdraws 
his/her consent and if there are no other legitimate grounds for retaining the data (see European 
Commission, 2012).  
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controllers to notify both data protection authorities and data subjects about data breaches 
without undue delay. This implies measures aimed at enhancing the accountability of those 
processing data: companies with more than 250 employees and in firms that are involved in 
processing operations which, by virtue of their nature, their scope or their purposes, present 
specific risks to the rights and freedoms of individuals will be asked to designate a Data 
Protection Officer. The proposed regulation also foresees very harsh sanctions for non-
compliance.  
In a recent commentary, Berkeley Professor Paul Schwartz (2013) observed that the proposed 
new rules would significantly affect US companies’ daily practice of authorising the sharing 
of personal information through simple ‘notice and consent’. As mentioned, the Proposed 
Regulation lists ‘consent’ as one of the legal justifications for the processing of personal data, 
but requires that written consent for personal information processing be presented in a form 
‘distinguishable’ from any other matter. More importantly, Article 7 of the proposed text 
places the burden of proof of demonstrating consent on the controller. This requirement 
“heightens the risk that a user’s consent will not stand up if a data protection commissioner or 
the user herself challenges the assent after the fact.”  
Finally, and most problematically, the proposed Regulation states that consent “shall not 
provide a legal basis for the processing” when “there is a significant imbalance between the 
position” of the controller and the party to whom the data refers. Thus, Internet companies 
would not be able to justify processing by a party’s consent if they offer take-it-or-leave-it 
terms for the processing of personal data or provide services for employees or other parties 
that lack effective bargaining power. As a consequence, Schwartz concludes that US IT 
companies will not be able to rely on one-sided click-through agreements. The new rules are 
far-reaching also in terms of jurisdiction, since the proposed Regulation potentially subjects 
all cloud services to EU privacy law.  
The effect of the expansion of the remit of EU data protection rules is already being felt while 
the general Data Protection Regulation is still pending final approval by EU institutions. In 
May 2014, the European Court of Justice (CJEU) ruled against Google in Google Spain SL, Google 
Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, Mario Costeja González, a case brought by a Spanish 
individual who requested the removal of a link to a digitised 1998 article in La Vanguardia 
newspaper about an auction for his foreclosed home for a debt that he had subsequently paid.48 
The court ruled in Costeja that search engines are ‘data controllers’ and, as such, are responsible 
for the content to which they point. Thus, Google was required to comply with EU data privacy 
laws. In so ruling, the Court also clarified that even if the physical server of the search engine 
operator processing the data is located outside Europe, EU rules apply if the operator has a 
branch or a subsidiary in a member state that promotes the selling of advertising space offered 
by the search engine. Moreover, search engines are to be considered controllers of personal 
data. Google can therefore not escape its responsibilities under European law when handling 
personal data by saying it is a search engine. EU data protection law applies, and so does the 
right to be forgotten. Furthermore, the CJEU ruled that individuals have the right – under 
certain conditions – to ask search engines to remove links with personal information about 
                                                   
48 Costeja initially attempted to have the article removed by complaining to Spain’s data protection 
agency, which rejected the claim on the grounds that it was lawful and accurate, but accepted a 
complaint against Google and asked Google to remove the results. Google sued in the Spanish Audiencia 
Nacional, which referred a series of questions to the CJEU. 
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them. This applies where the information is inaccurate, inadequate or excessive and is subject 
to a balancing test with other fundamental rights such as freedom of expression. The 
responsibility for performing this test rests with the data controller in the first instance.  
The Costeja case is a good example of the tendency, increasingly evident in Europe, to expand 
the territorial scope of EU data protection rules to avoid their circumvention by the locating of 
servers outside the territory of the EU and to increasingly ask online intermediaries to 
cooperate in the enforcement of the EU rules. The latter tendency is, indeed, consistent with 
other reforms currently being discussed in the EU, including the proposed reform of the 2001 
Information Society Directive and the 2000 e-Commerce Directive.  
6.2 Cross-border data flows: What future for the US-EU Safe Harbour? 
The EU data protection Directive also governs the transfer of data, permitting data transfers 
only to other countries with an ‘adequate’ level of protection. The US does not appear on the 
list of countries with ‘adequate’ protection. However, the US Department of Commerce (DoC) 
in consultation with the EU developed a Safe Harbour agreement so that that US companies 
can transfer European data to the United States if the company handling the transfer 
essentially complies with the DPD in handling and processing the data. Today, almost 5,000 
organisations are reportedly certified under the Safe Harbour framework.  
Safe Harbour principles include the following: 
 Notice: Individuals must be informed that their data are being collected and about how it 
will be used. 
 Choice: Individuals must have the option to opt-out of the collection and forward transfer 
of the data to third parties. 
 Onward transfer: Transfers of data to third parties may only occur to other organisations 
that follow adequate data protection principles. 
 Security: Reasonable efforts must be made to prevent loss of collected information. 
 Data integrity: Data must be relevant and reliable for the purpose for which it was collected. 
 Access: Individuals must be able to access information held about them and correct or 
delete it if it is inaccurate. 
 Enforcement: There must be effective means of enforcing these rules.  
The Safe Harbour has always been controversial: in Germany, data protection authorities have 
voiced their concerns since 2010.49 After the Snowden revelations, some member states, the 
European Commission and, in March 2014, the European Parliament called for a suspension 
and a thorough revision of the Safe Harbour.50 Meanwhile, on the basis of a thorough analysis 
                                                   
49 In 2010, the Dusseldorf Kreis, a working group comprised of 16 German state DPAs that are 
responsible for the private sector, issued a resolution requiring German data exporters to exercise 
additional diligence when transferring data to Safe Harbour-certified organisations, and prohibited 
German data exporters from relying solely on Safe Harbour in order to transfer data to the US, By 
requiring additional diligence, the resolution appeared to question Safe Harbour, and whether the 
system was sufficient to demonstrate an adequate level of protection for personal data. 
50 In July 2013, the Conference of the German Data Protection Commissioners, including both federal 
and state Commissioners, issued a press release stating that surveillance activities by foreign 
intelligence and security agencies threaten international data traffic between Germany and countries 
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and consultations with companies, the European Commission made 13 recommendations to 
improve the functioning of the Safe Harbour scheme. The Commission called on US 
authorities to identify remedies by summer 2014 (but the deadline was not met). The 
Commission would then review the functioning of the Safe Harbour scheme based on the 
implementation of these 13 recommendations. 
The Commission’s recommendations address four key areas.  
 First, in terms of transparency, the Commission recommended that self-certified companies 
should publicly disclose their privacy policies, that online Safe Harbour privacy policies 
should include a link to the Department of Commerce’s Safe Harbour list of current Safe 
Harbour members, that self-certified companies publish privacy conditions of any 
contracts they conclude with subcontractors, and that the DoC’s Safe Harbour list clearly 
flags those companies that are not current members.  
 Second, on redress, the Commission stated that online Safe Harbour privacy policies should 
include a link to the chosen Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) provider, that the ADR 
choice should be readily available and affordable, and that the DoC should systematically 
monitor ADR providers, specifically in relation to the transparency and accessibility of 
their procedures and how they follow up complaints.  
 Third, concerning enforcement, Safe Harbour members should be subject to spot check ex-
officio investigations in order to verify the substantive compliance of their privacy policies. 
In addition, where there has been a finding of non-compliance, follow-up investigations 
should be implemented after one year. The DoC should inform the competent EU DPA of 
pending complaints and suspected non-compliance. Finally, allegations of false claims of 
Safe Harbour adherence should be investigated thoroughly.  
 Finally, on the issue of access to data by US authorities, the Commission stated that Safe 
Harbour privacy policies should specify the extent to which US law allows public 
authorities to collect and process data transferred under Safe Harbour and that the national 
security exception under Safe Harbour should be used only to the extent strictly necessary 
or proportionate.  
In addition to the recommendations, new developments have created even more tensions 
between the two blocs. The concerns, initially voiced mostly with respect to existing 
legislation, have also gradually moved towards questioning the conduct of giant online 
intermediaries, accused of infringing even the principles of the Safe Harbour. Most notably, 
Austrian privacy activist Max Schrems argued that the National Security Agency’s PRISM 
programme has shown that no meaningful data protection for Europeans exists under US law 
and that Facebook Ireland was “facilitating the processing of such data.”51 In a letter dated 26 
July 2013, the Irish Data Protection Commissioner refused to investigate Facebook because the 
                                                   
outside the EEA. In light of these recent developments, the German Commissioners decided to stop 
issuing approvals for international data transfers until the German government can demonstrate that 
unlimited access to German citizens’ personal data by foreign national intelligence services complies 
with fundamental principles of data protection law (namely, necessity, proportionality and purpose 
limitation). 
51 Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner [2014] IEHC 310; [2014] 3 CMLR 37 (text freely available at 
<www.europe-v-facebook.org/hcj.pdf> accessed 14 November 2014). 
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Irish branch of the company was registered under the Safe Harbour arrangement and 
provided access to US law enforcement. Following these considerations, the Irish High Court 
decided on 18 June 2014 to refer the case to the CJEU. While the ruling is expected by the end 
of 2015, various committees of the European Parliament have called for an official intervention 
in the case. The opinion of the CJEU’s Advocate General on this case, originally expected on 
24 June 2015, has meanwhile been delayed. At the same time, a coordinated series of 
investigations into Facebook’s privacy practices is being carried out by privacy regulators in 
the Netherlands, Spain, France and Germany. On 15 May 2015, Belgium’s Privacy Commission 
released a report examining the new privacy policies that Facebook implemented this year for 
use of data from its services, which include Instagram and WhatsApp, to target advertising. 
The report observes that Facebook processes the personal data of its members as well as other 
Internet users “in secret”, without asking for consent or adequately explaining how the data 
would be used; and the president of the Belgian authority publicly stated: “The way in which 
[Facebook] is contemptuous of the private lives of its members and of all Internet users 
demands action.”52 
As tensions mount in the EU, the US has shown signs of reaction. In 2014, the FTC brought 
several instances of enforcement, including high-profile actions against MySpace, Facebook, 
and Google.53 In 2015, actions were brought against companies that were falsely claiming to 
be under Safe Harbour certification in an attempt to show more concern for the adequacy of 
the Safe Harbour’s self-certification procedure.54 Similarly, the Department of Commerce, 
which is responsible for administering the programme, is likely to increase the rigor with 
which it oversees the programme. While the certification process is a self-certification 
programme and not subject to formal regulatory approval, an increase in substantive focus 
from the Department of Commerce during the certification phase and thereafter is likely as a 
result of the pressure from Europe.  
Moreover, both courts and legislators have taken action to address the problem of bulk 
collection of metadata. An important legal clarification came recently from the US Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit in ACLU v. Clapper, in which the Court ruled that the NSA’s 
bulk collection of phone and other records was never authorised under section 215 of the US 
                                                   
52 See “Belgian Watchdog Raps Facebook for Treating Personal Data ‘with Contempt’”, Lisa Fleischer 
and Tom Fairless, Wall Street Journal, 15 May 2015 (www.wsj.com/articles/belgian-watchdog-slams-
facebooks-privacy-controls-1431685985).  
53 See e.g. “Google, Facebook, MySpace: Privacy rule breakers or trend makers?”, John Fontana, ZDNet 
(www.zdnet.com/article/google-facebook-myspace-privacy-rule-breakers-or-trend-makers/). 
54 In January 2014, the FTC announced settlements with 12 companies that allegedly falsely claimed 
they complied with Safe Harbour, even though there were no substantive violations of the Safe Harbour 
privacy principles. In February, the Commission announced a proposed settlement with Fantage.com 
for allegedly deceptively claiming in its privacy policy that it held a current Safe Harbour certification, 
when in fact its certification had lapsed in June 2012. In May 2014, the FTC announced a settlement with 
the clothing manufacturer American Apparel related to charges that the company falsely claimed to 
comply with Safe Harbour, even though it had allowed the certification to expire. In November 2014, 
the FTC announced that data privacy certifier True Ultimate Standards Everywhere, Inc. (‘TRUSTe’) 
agreed to settle charges that the company deceived consumers about its Safe Harbour recertification 
programme (see Press Release, “FTC Settles with Two Companies Falsely Claiming to Comply with 
International Safe Harbour Privacy Framework”, 7 April 2015 at www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2015/04/ftc-settles-two-companies-falsely-claiming-comply-international).  
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PATRIOT Act. The appellate court’s decision in ACLU v. Clapper is the culmination of a series 
of lawsuits by activists and the civil liberties community aimed at putting an end to the NSA’s 
mass surveillance programmes.  
This decision arrived just as the US PATRIOT Act (set to expire at the end of May 2015) was 
being replaced by the US Freedom Act, approved by the House Judiciary Committee on 19 
May 2015, and now finally signed into law on 2 June 2015.55 The new Act explicitly bans the 
limitless collection of telephone data by forcing the government to use a ‘specific selection 
term’ (SST) in any surveillance warrant and replaces the centralised bulk-data collection 
system with an obligation for network providers to store data and, upon request, deliver it to 
the government. More specifically, the Act requires the FBI, in applications for ongoing 
production of call detail records for investigations to protect against international terrorism, 
to show reasonable grounds to believe that the call detail records are relevant to such 
investigation; and a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the SST is associated with a foreign 
power or an agent of a foreign power engaged in international terrorism or activities in 
preparation for such terrorism.  
The Act also requires a judge approving such an ongoing release of call detail records for an 
investigation to protect against international terrorism to limit such production to a period not 
to exceed 180 days but allow such orders to be extended upon application, subject to approval 
by the FISA Court. The Act will allow the government to require the production of an initial 
set of call records using the reasonable, articulable suspicion standard that the term is 
associated with a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and then a subsequent set of 
call records using session-identifying information or a telephone calling-card number 
identified by the specific selection term that was used to produce the initial set of records (thus 
limiting the government to what is commonly referred to as two ‘hops’ of call records). The 
government should however adopt minimisation procedures requiring prompt destruction of 
produced call records that are not foreign intelligence information. 
This new system has been criticised for failing to remove massive data collection (which, critics 
say, is only delegated to private corporations), and at the same time reducing the efficiency 
and effectiveness of government surveillance action. Criticisms have also been raised since a 
few hours after signing the act into law, the Obama administration reportedly asked the FISA 
court to restore the mass data collection at least for a transitional period of six months, even 
clarifying that the ACLU v. Clapper decision, being a second circuit ruling, does not constitute 
controlling precedent for the FISA court.56 The Act also re-authorises Section 215 of the US 
PATRIOT Act and Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act (see above) through to the end of 
2017. Against this background, the new Freedom Act seems unlikely to achieve all the steps 
forward that EU authorities were expecting, and its actual impact on mass surveillance 
activities seems obscure at best at the time of writing. 
Finally, another development in the United States is the introduction in the House of a 
proposed Judicial Redress Act of 2015 by Representatives from both of the leading parties. The 
                                                   
55 Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline Over 
Monitoring Act of 2015 or the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.  
56 See, inter alia, S. Ackerman, “Obama lawyers asked secret court to ignore public court's decision on 
spying”, The Guardian, 9 June (www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/09/obama-fisa-court-
surveillance-phone-records).  
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Act aims at extending to citizens of designated countries (including EU member states) the 
right to challenge possible misuse of their data by the US government in US courts. The 
proposed Act would allow the Attorney General to extend US judicial redress protections to 
citizens of selected third countries. If eventually passed by Congress, the Act would address 
some of the key concerns expressed over the past few years by EU institutions with respect to 
US privacy laws. For example, former EU Vice-President and Commissioner for Justice 
Viviane Reding observed: “When Americans come to Europe and they think the authorities 
have not handled their case correctly, they can go to a European court. However an EU citizen 
cannot do the same in the US and go to an American court. There is no reciprocity; we do not 
have the basis for judicial redress …  The US has recognised the importance of this request on 
several occasions – but they need to have a law. I have not yet seen it.”57 Also the new 
European Commission President Juncker wrote in his mission letter to Vĕra Jourová, the new 
Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality, that one of her tasks will be to 
“conclude negotiations on a comprehensive EU-US data protection agreement which provides 
justiciable rights for all EU citizens, regardless of where they reside, as well as reviewing the 
Safe Harbour arrangement”. 
Will these initiatives be enough to avoid the suspension of the Safe Harbour? As things stand, 
it is still unclear whether or not the US will implement the entirety of the EU’s 
recommendations, such as empowering the FTC to conduct ex-officio investigations to assure 
that US companies are in compliance with their privacy policies and that any false claims 
would eventually be further investigated. At the end of 2014, when taking office, Ms Jourová 
already expressed strong doubts that Safe Harbour can be considered as really secure for EU 
citizens and called for a ‘plan B’. Vice President Andrus Ansip was even more aggressive and 
specified that if there are no satisfying results from negotiations with the US, “the suspension 
of the agreement might then be the option”.58 Some commentators have reported that the 
negotiation pendulum is shifting between calls for interoperability of EU and US legislation; 
proposals to suspend the Safe Harbour and take it out of the TTIP, also due to the European 
Commission’s uncertain mandate;59 and more aggressive calls for ‘data localisation’ 
requirements, with localisation even being presented as a fundamental right. This is even more 
worrying since on the US side, drafts from the e-commerce section of TTIP include completely 
opposite stances: the principle of ‘interoperability’ of European and US data protection rules, 
and a ban on ‘localisation.’ In October 2014, the US negotiators placed a concrete text proposal 
on ‘data flows’ on the table. But the papers published in January 2015 by the European 
                                                   
57 See Vivian Reding’s speech at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-431_en.htm.  
58 See the initial hearing of Andrus Ansip in the European Parliament (www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
hearings-2014/resources/library/media/20141022RES75838/20141022RES75838.pdf).  
59 The negotiation mandate for the European Commission instead refers to Article XIV of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) of the World Trade Organization. Article XIV contains a general 
exception clause stipulating that "nothing in the agreement may be construed to prevent the adoption 
or enforcement by any member of measures [...] necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations 
[...] relating to [...] the protection of the privacy of individuals in relation to the processing and 
dissemination of personal data." The Commission's negotiation mandate states in Article 18: "The 
Agreement will not preclude the enforcement of exceptions on the supply of services justifiable under 
the relevant WTO rules (Articles XIV and XIVbis GATS)."Article XIV of GATS was indeed copied 
verbatim into a draft text of the TTIP agreement proposed by the Commission negotiators in July 2013 
and leaked in February 2014. 
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Commission clearly state: “Data protection standards won’t be part of TTIP negotiations. TTIP 
will make sure that the EU’s data protection laws prevail over any commitments.”60 
6.3 What landing zones for data protection in the TTIP? 
In an age of convergence, globalisation, and the data-driven economy, the US and the EU do 
not seem to be converging fast enough in their approaches to data protection. First, existing 
legislation confirms the existence of key differences in the main approaches followed by the 
two legal systems, with a clear focus on government intrusion into the private sphere in the 
US and significant emphasis on the relationship between data controllers and data subjects in 
the EU. Second, and relatedly, while in the United States privacy law focuses on redressing 
consumer harm and balancing privacy with efficient commercial transactions, in the EU 
privacy is considered as a fundamental right that prevails over competing interests (Hartzog 
and Solove 2014). Third, privacy protection is essentially triggered by the existence of 
‘personal data’ or ‘personally identifiable information’ (PII): however, the definition of PII on 
the two sides of the Atlantic diverges significantly, with the US featuring a patchwork or partly 
inconsistent definitions and the EU relying on a single definition that broadly defines PII to 
encompass all information that is identifiable to a person.61 Fourth, coverage of both personal 
identified and identifiable information seems to be more consistent in Europe than in the US: 
however, the EU seems too expansionist in its coverage of PII, whereas the US might err at the 
opposite extreme.  
In addition, frictions between the US and EU authorities have mounted in the months 
following the Datagate scandal, such that even established cooperation and recognition 
frameworks such as the Safe Harbour regime are now being reconsidered. Calls for a European 
cloud or even clouds limited to national territory (e.g. in Germany) have become common in 
the debate over cloud privacy and security. The European Parliament has expressed its 
intention to reconsider the Safe Harbour as well as the Data Protection Umbrella Agreement 
that has been under discussion between the two parties since 2011. Reforms underway in the 
United States, including the US Freedom Act, do not seem to fully address the concerns 
expressed by the EU authorities, and the negotiations on the Safe Harbour seems still likely to 
face problems: on the one hand, EU authorities deem US privacy laws inadequate in terms of 
the level of protection they achieve for European citizens and increasingly consider data 
localisation as a fundamental right; on the other hand, US authorities seek to obtain a 
recognition of interoperability and a ban on data localisation in the TTIP negotiations. In short, 
the parties are almost as far from an agreement as they were a year ago, and despite some 
signs of good will the tensions are unlikely to be put to rest any time soon: on the contrary, the 
situation is even worsening as some EU member states are now taking action to create massive 
surveillance programmes, as in the case of France, which (after the terrorist attacks of January 
2015) is considering the instruction of a Loi de renseignement (Intelligence Bill) that would go 
further than the US PATRIOT Act and the already annulled EU Data Retention Directive in 
                                                   
60 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_152999.2%20Services.pdf  
61 Hartzog & Solove (2014, p. 888) explain that there are three predominant approaches to defining 
personal information in the US: 1) the tautological approach, 2) the non-public approach and 3) the 
specific-types approach.  
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providing authorities with new technologies of mass surveillance of electronic 
communications.62  
Needless to say, the persistence of divergent approaches can become an obstacle (or, at a 
minimum, a source of unnecessary compliance burdens) for companies wishing to provide 
Internet-based services on both sides of the Atlantic. This is especially the case for world-
leading US-based Internet companies, which would profit enormously from a streamlining, 
update, and harmonisation of the definition of PII and, more generally, of the rules that apply 
to online data protection. To be sure, the Internet is challenging both legal regimes in a way 
that might end up requiring a thorough reform process. As of now, what seems likely is that 
the US will keep under-protecting privacy in the name of efficient commercial transactions 
(with a great responsibility being placed on the FTC to monitor abuses of bargaining power 
and other deceptive/abusive practices), whereas in the EU, Internet services might end up 
caught in the net of an overly formalistic, overly comprehensive legal framework, which leaves 
little room for trade-offs between privacy and welfare-enhancing customised service for data 
subjects.  
Conclusions: What should the Digital TTIP achieve and what will it 
achieve? 
Notwithstanding the strong political commitment shown by both the US and EU negotiators 
to speed up the conclusion of the TTIP agreement, the overall environment does not seem 
favourable to a comprehensive agreement in the digital sphere. Suffice it to recall that in a 
recent interview, President Barack Obama accused European corporations and regulators to 
be strategically hampering the position of US Internet companies.63 The underlying reason, 
according to the American President, is that European companies “can’t compete with us” and 
thus need to alter the level playing field to be able to survive. The reference is not only to the 
ongoing antitrust investigation into Google, but also to recent calls by the European 
Parliament to unbundle search engines (read: Google) from other commercial services, the 
current uprising of taxi drivers against Uber in many cities, the mounting debate on tax 
avoidance practices by several IT companies, the wave of ‘Google taxes’ imposed to 
remunerate publishers and the repeated calls to suspend the US-EU Safe Harbour agreement 
on data protection due to the alleged unreliability of US companies’ privacy policies. Obama’s 
statements triggered a blunt reaction: a European Commission’s spokesperson called these 
comments “out of line”.64  
                                                   
62 These new technologies include so-called ‘black boxes’ or source code injected by French intelligence 
services on ISPs’ infrastructure to detect suspicious user behaviour in real time. This would bring all 
(residents in France) under surveillance and expand monitoring to include private pictures, company 
trade secrets, medical records, etc. The authorities are expected shortly to propose a new register for 
suspected persons and new measures to record phone calls without authorisation from a judge, thus 
undermining data privacy protections. 
63  See “Obama attacks Europe over technology protectionism”, by Murad Ahmed, Duncan Robinson 
and Richard Waters, Financial Times, 16 February 2015 (www.ft.com/cms/s/0/41d968d6-b5d2-11e4-
b58d-00144feab7de.html#axzz3ejxpiSNf).   
64  Ibid.  
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Is Obama right or wrong? To be sure, much of the EU regulation that applies to the Internet is 
stricter than US regulation, but these rules apply regardless of nationality. In the EU, network 
operators have to share their networks even when they invest in high-speed broadband, while 
in the US such obligation was lifted a decade ago. In the EU, privacy is a fundamental right, 
whereas in the US it is treated as a tradable right. In the EU, antitrust follows a different 
approach than the US, and this usually results in stricter remedies imposed on companies with 
market power. Other fields, such as cybersecurity and consumer protection are more regulated 
in the EU than they are in the US. These rules have been applied more often to US companies 
since these companies have come to dominate the Internet ecosystem since the early days. In 
some cases, an aggravating factor was that EU rules were largely unfit for the Internet age, 
and this created significant problems when it came to their application to the Internet. That 
said, there is reason to believe that it is mostly the inadequate and obsolete features of EU law, 
rather than a design to hamper US companies, that inspired the Commission in these actions. 
Otherwise, important merger cases such as Google/DoubleClick, Google/ITA, 
Facebook/WhatsApp, Microsoft/Nokia, Microsoft/Skype and others would have been 
handled differently by the Brussels trustbusters. 
The past months, however, have marked a change of direction. Many recent documents of the 
European Commission and European Parliament speak clearly of the need to revive industrial 
policy in a way that protects EU champions against the current domination of US Internet 
companies. The Commissioner for the digital agenda Günther Oettinger claims that EU 
telecom companies should become more profitable. Conferences are being organised in the 
Parliament with titles such as “How can we stop Internet giants?”. Google and Facebook are 
constantly demonised in the public debate, not to mention Uber (but this would probably 
occur even if Uber were European) and Amazon (recently accused of unfair tax deals in, and 
with, Luxembourg). The Digital Single Market debate is mostly centred around industry 
consolidation and the creation of large mobile operators that would negotiate on a more equal 
footing with the Googles and the Apples. In Germany and France, pressure from content 
providers and publishers even led institutions to think that splitting Google could be 
reasonable. The European Parliament followed this trend by advocating such a structural 
remedy in the belief that “indexation, evaluation, presentation and ranking by search engines 
must be unbiased and transparent” (although an in-depth discussion of effects on users has 
never occurred to date). And most importantly, the European Commission is reportedly 
considering the extension of regulation from telecoms infrastructure to Internet platforms, in 
the name of so-called ‘platform neutrality’. Such move would impose interoperability 
obligations on all leading platforms, in the attempt to create a neutral Internet. And again, it 
would likely damage consumers.   
Getting out of this impasse and inverting the current trend of divergence requires an effort on 
both sides, and TTIP talks could become a viable setting to this end. The EU should understand 
that economic recovery would be hampered, not helped, by a revival of protectionism, and 
that the word “neutrality” is not a panacea for all the evils of the Internet, but rather a double-
edged sword to be handled with care. Not surprisingly, but also not fully convincingly, the 
European Commission has taken great pains to reassure the United States that the DSM is not 
a protectionist strategy. The US should do its homework on data protection, settle the network 
neutrality debate with a convincing compromise, and avoid that the urge to claim US 
leadership in global Internet talks ends up bringing the Internet under an unprecedented, ill-
advised wave of regulatory interventionism. Should the TTIP take the form of a ‘living 
agreement,’ as seems likely, then obvious starting points would be the easy-to-reach 
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agreements on e-labelling and e-accessibility, plus (if possible) an agreement to cooperate on 
standards related to cloud computing and the Internet of Things. In the coming years, 
however, it would be of utmost importance that such agreement encompasses network 
neutrality rules, data protection rules, intermediary liability, online copyright protection and 
related exceptions and limitations, and gradual convergence of competition law and policy in 
a field that is increasingly thirsty for legal certainty and streamlined, converging regulatory 
requirements on both sides of the Atlantic.  
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